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Abstract 
The paper provides a new approach to the classification of EU countries 
into innovation-performance groups, taking into account their social regime.  
In the Introduction, it draws on some empirical evidence of synchronised 
research and development (R&D) performance within a social regime. In the 
second and third parts it reviews the literature on measuring R&D performance, 
and in the fourth part it summarizes social regime classifications. The fifth and 
longest part of the paper proceeds to a comparative analysis of the empirical 
data, pointing out disparities, both respects to numbers and members, in the 
composition of innovation-performance groups. In the final part, the paper 
summarizes key findings. 
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1. Introduction 
The current state of literature demonstrates, based on a reasonably sizable 
amount of evidence, that EU countries may be divided into innovation leaders 
and innovation laggards. However, we have not so far witnessed any attempts to 
distinguish EU social regimes by research and development (R&D) 
performance, although there is empirical evidence that social regimes and 
innovation performance do interact (Puškárová 2012).  
Innovation is of an intangible nature, which makes its quantification 
particularly tricky. The scientific literature agrees on three basic approaches:  
1. Input,  
2. Output, 
3. Indirect effects.  
The input and output methods draw on a model of the innovation process, 
while the indirect method is implied by the Cobb-Douglas production function.  
In addition, the literature exposes (although maybe not explicitly) 
parameters derived from input and output ones, e.g. elasticity of R&D 
expenditures, productivity of R&D workforce, profitability of R&D inputs, etc.  
We decided to draw on this current state of the literature and summarize 
key findings, using comparative analysis of selected parameters.  
Based on the data available, we decided to anchor our analysis in the data 
derived mainly from EUROSTAT, as explained further on in the paper. 
2. Parameterization of innovation through inputs/output 
The innovation process can be visualized by the following Figure 1. 
Figure1. Innovation process 
 
Source: authors‘ own visualisation of EUROSTAT methodology. 
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The model demonstrates that the two standard production inputs – labour 
and capital - are processed in order to deliver the desired outcome, i.e. a patent 
application leading hopefully to a patent. The labour input in the innovation 
process is required to demonstrate, however, a certain additional quality 
compared to the usual labour input. The nature of the innovation process implies 
that the labour must be both highly skilled and highly creative, i.e. that it 
possesses a certain level of human capital which can be transformed into  
a tangible product known as intellectual capital.  
The creativity of labour input and its expertise in utilizing this creativity 
determine the quality and quantity of the innovation process outcome.  
In the common scientific consensus, the innovation process results in  
a patent or a patent application. However, we need to bear in mind that a lot of 
creative work remains unprotected by a patent, and thus the outcome of creative 
labour and capital inputs cannot be measured by the limited terms of a patent alone.  
Pros and cons of parameterization through input/output 
One of the most often articulated defects of measuring innovation through 
R&D expenditures (capital input into the innovation process) is that it ignores 
the stochastic nature of the innovation process (Keller 2010, p. 804). Pertinent 
results of the R&D expenditures come mostly with some time delay, and thus 
often do not appear in the same year that the R&D expenditures were incurred. 
In other words, the results of R&D expenditures from a certain time unit (year) 
may emerge in the same or in several consecutive years.  
Some researchers reduce the significance of this flaw in the analysis by 
applying only business R&D expenditures. It is arguable that returns on business 
R&D is empirically higher than public (and thus more or less also total) R&D.  
In our opinion however, this approach does not eliminate the impact of this 
defect completely (many business projects are split into several years), and 
further, it undermines the multiplication effect of public R&D, which accounts 
for the major R&D source in the “new” member countries.  
The output method of innovation parameterization concentrates on 
innovation output, most commonly measured by patent volumes, i.e. the number 
of patent applications. Various patent offices maintain their own records on 
patent data, as well as providing information to the other statistical offices. 
The advantage of patent data analysis is simple – a patent is an 
indisputable form of concrete evidence that the R&D is about to generate profits 
in the form of licene fees, fees for patent usage, etc.  
The output parameterization of innovation has, nonetheless, its flaws too. 
Many patents are just upgrades of already existing patents, i.e. their value should 
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be partially attributed to former R&D (e.g. Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002). Besides, 
the decision whether to apply for a patent relates to the particular company, and 
the literature exhibits a fair amount of evidence that a lot of innovation is not 
protected by an official patent, even though it is in use (e.g. Griliches 1990).  
One important practice can be observed in the current state of literature: in 
analysing R&D performance, the number of patent applications is preferred to 
the number of registered patents. The reason, in our assumption, lays in time 
delays attributable to the administration of a patent application – granting  
a patent may last up till several years and thus, the time coherence between 
R&D and its results deteriorates more than when a patent application is used for 
measurement of an output.  
3. Parameterization of innovation through TFP 
The most common technology parameterization is based on the thesis of 
its effect – i.e. increased productivity of production inputs. This effect is, in the 
literature, made equal to the parameter A = TFP (total factor productivity) from 
the Cobb-Douglas production function. Equation 1 below gives the calculation 
of TFP: 
                         (1) 
Contrary to the input and output parameters of technology, TFP is  
a derived indicator, i.e. its value is calculated from the primary data on 
production inputs and output.  
Pros and cons of parameterization through TFP 
The advantage of the idea of the Solow residual (how TFP is often 
addressed) is as follows: as a residual of the inputs productivity, it embodies all 
the innovation (even unregistered patents) that is effectively used and 
contributes directly to growth. Thus, it is the truest measure of innovation’s 
effect on growth. 
However, there has been a rather fierce discussion in the literature 
throughout the years regarding both the calculation of TFP nominal values, and 
its real impact on the growth.  
The calculation of the TFP is rather ambiguous, due to the risk of 
measurement error and the risk of selected variable bias, whereby manipulation 
of primary data exerts a significant effect on the calculated TFP data, and as  
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a result some part of TFP value can be neglected (Katayama et al 2009). Due to 
these difficulties, the literature also provides certain solutions. One of them 
suggests working with TFP growth rates instead of TFP nominal values. This 
approach is recommended especially by ceteris paribus. Another resolution 
might be derived from the application of nominal TFP values together with input 
parameters of technology, mostly R&D expenditures (Griliches 1984, Keller 2010). 
However, the application of TFP growth terms may also not show the 
impact of innovation on GDP growth so purely. The concern is that when 
extracting human capital (parameterized by the education received) from TFP 
and considering it as a part of labour input (which is also commonly viewed as 
the most characteristic feature of the R&D workforce), the importance of TFP 
growth for economic growth drops rapidly (Manuelli and Seshadri 2010). 
In the light of all the discussions over TFP mentioned above, and 
inasmuch as TFP is also a matter of technology spillovers (Eaton and Kortum 
1999), we decided not to use TFP as the suitable indicator for analysis of a social 
regime’s R&D performance. 
4. Determination of social regimes 
Although some empirical evidence shows that R&D performance and 
social regimes do interact (the EU’s most innovative countries maintain the most 
generous social protection nets), the scientific literature seems reluctant to 
analyse this nexus. This phenomenon challenges the traditional theoretical 
assumption that individualism (and not solidarity) motivates a nation to innovate 
(this assumption is the key notion of liberalism).  
In our analysis, we decided to distinguish EU countries by social regimes 
according to the analysis established by Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 28-54), 
upgraded by Bohle and Greskovits (2007) and Ferrera (1996) and Bonoli (1997), 
as follows: 
a) liberal (UK, Ireland) 
b) social-democratic (Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Finland, Sweden) 
c) conservative (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy) 
d) southern (Italy, Spain, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus, Greece) 
e) neoliberal (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 
f) embedded neoliberal (V4 countries) 
g) neocorporativist (Slovenia). 
Esping-Andersen defined the three models (a-c) based on decommodification 
indices and the implicit level of stratification, whereby the social-democratic 
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regime demonstrates the strongest redistribution of income throughout the social 
groups, and the liberal regime demonstrates the lowest level of solidarity with 
the low-income and handicapped groups.  
Despite numerous critiques of Esping-Andersen’s categorization, based 
primarily on the limited number of countries in question, the over-estimation of 
the impact of social security benefits, and the neglect of gender implications, this 
classification is nonetheless widely preferred due to its easy and wide applicability. 
Ferrera and Bonoli argued that the southern EU states cannot be defined 
by either of Esping-Andersen’s social regimes because they are characterized by: 
• high fragmentation and polarization of society, where pension system is 
generous but nonetheless many groups are excluded from the social protection; 
• deviation from traditional corporate provision of health insurance; 
• high degree of collision between the systems of private and public social 
institutions; 
• unresolved nepotism in the distribution of social benefits.  
Bohle and Greskovits further argue that the “new EU countries“ cannot be 
classified by Esping-Andersen’s social regimes since they still lack the tradition 
(i.e. experience) in terms of public social institutions, a market economy, social 
inclusiveness and macroeconomic stability.  
5. Profiling EU social regimes based on selected innovation parameters 
In this part, we proceed to visualisation of various innovation parameters 
on the level of EU social regimes, and in doing so detect disparities.  
5.1. Performance of EU social regimes in terms of their average R&D 
expenditures 
In terms of real average R&D expenditures, we register continuous 
growth in all social regimes. The most successful are the Scandinavian 
countries, which stand out against other social regimes (Figure 2). 
By considering national deviations from the social regime average level, 
we can detect a few significant countries, although not among the countries and 
regimes with the highest R&D spending (Table 1).  
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Figure 2.  Average R&D expenditures in EU social regimes, constant 2000 prices, PPS, p.c.  
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Source: author’s own elaboration, calculation based on total social protection expenditures derived from 
EUROSTAT 2013 databases. 
In the group of the six EU-founders, we can identify two development 
trajectories: Germany’s strong convergence towards the Scandinavian countries 
in terms of R&D expenditures levels, and the trajectory of French-speaking 
countries – BENELUX2 and France, which rank among the EU’s average R&D 
spending countries. The lowest R&D spending country from this group is 
indisputably Italy, which converges in absolute R&D expenditures terms 
towards their more culture-similar countries of southern social regimes. 
Throughout the observed period, Austria has had the role of most R&D 
accumulating country among all the EU countries, and not only in terms of R&D 
expenditures in PPS and in % GDP. Since 2002, it exceeds, in terms of inflation-
free PPS, even its strong strategic partner – Germany. In terms of R&D 
expenditures as a share of GDP share, it is however still catching up to the level 
of Germany.  
 
                                                 
2
 Please note that in terms of R&D expenditures as a GDP share, Luxembourg does not 
demonstrate even the EU average level.  
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The liberal social regime shows a strong convergence between the R&D 
expenditures of Ireland and Great Britain. 
The southern regime is also characterized by convergence. The below-
average levels of R&D expenditures in this category put the countries of the 
southern regime into the position of innovation laggards, although still spending 
more on R&D than the countries of neoliberal or embedded neoliberal regimes. 
However, it is important to pay attention to Portugal, which managed to double 
its R&D spending between 2005 and 2009 from 0.75 % to 1.5 % GDP. 
The “new“ EU member states (i.e., those acceding to the EU in 2004 and 
2007) are the lowest R&D spending group. The only exception is Slovenia, 
which has accelerated its R&D in 2009, despite its low starting R&D volume in 
1995, up to the level of the liberal economies. In this group, the highest R&D 
spending countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary. Slovakia is the 
only country from this group that has experienced severe cuts in R&D 
expenditures, which were only partially compensated for by the increase in R&D 
expenditures in the last two years of the observed period.  
Table 1 clearly shows that among the highest R&D spending social 
regimes a strong convergence exists, while among the lowest R&D spending 
social regimes a strong divergence takes place throughout the observed period. 
This may imply a more general thesis that in the earlier stages of economic 
development, the R&D spending policies vary by country. However, more 
developed countries attain the R&D spending limits, and other countries do 
catch up.  
Further, we assume that this R&D spending limit is determined by its 
culturally-shaped (biased) social regime.  
Table 1. Convergence within EU social regimes, measured by standard deviation of national R&D 
expenditures 
 
SOC-
DEM 
CONS - 
German 
speaking 
CONS - 
French 
speaking 
LIB SOUTH NEOLIB EMB. NEOLIB 
1995 153.29 191.48 50.31 116.39 41.77 20.18 30.49 
1996 152.52 189.38 39.32 91.50 45.04 17.02 34.92 
1997 151.21 181.34 27.90 77.36 45.54 13.51 42.58 
1998 154.06 175.65 17.92 77.50 53.58 9.90 42.78 
1999 152.82 160.22 22.02 88.95 55.85 14.81 43.66 
2000 196.77 151.81 13.57 92.42 62.37 10.53 50.08 
2001 209.00 142.81 6.73 92.35 64.60 17.47 52.57 
2002 182.81 143.27 13.11 87.68 68.55 19.36 55.11 
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2003 161.90 136.67 17.96 69.23 73.68 25.67 58.49 
2004 158.17 142.38 19.07 46.74 65.10 30.26 59.83 
2005 167.38 124.66 20.44 47.66 68.97 29.88 73.92 
2006 189.14 156.14 17.62 49.50 75.81 40.67 86.96 
2007 152.62 141.09 10.91 46.53 85.31 43.69 89.31 
2008 154.40 109.26 12.14 21.00 100.36 55.78 83.76 
2009 113.52 104.32 8.02 14.71 99.99 66.20 84.58 
2010 112.21 85.32 3.07 33.23 92.74 76.13 88.68 
Source: authors’ own calculations, based on the data used in Figure 2 derived from EUROSTAT 2013 
databases. 
5.2. Performance of EU social regimes in terms of EPO patent applications 
This paper is aimed also at observing the development of the innovation 
output parameter (Figure 3). In the light of all the advantages and disadvantages 
of innovation output parameters mentioned in the second part of this paper, we 
decided to concentrate on only the number of EPO (European Patenting Office) 
patent applications (per population unit, i.e. per million inhabitants). 
Figure 3.  Average EPO patent applications in EU social regimes, per million inhabitants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: authors‘ own elaboration, calculations based on EPO patent applications data derived 
from EUROSTAT 2013 databases. 
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Figure 3 demonstrates a strong convergence of the number of EPO patent 
applications between the two groups of conservative and social-democratic 
regimes, which are the best performing groups in the EU in terms of EPO patent 
applications. However, since 2005 we may observe that the French-speaking 
countries seceded from the trajectory and did not manage to keep up to the pace 
of EPO patent applications of Germany and Austria.  
In terms of the deviations in national data deviations compared to the 
social regime average (Table 2 below), we can summarize further as follows:  
Although the countries of the social-democratic regime do converge in 
terms of EPO patent applications, there is still a great gap between Sweden and 
the catching-up countries of Denmark and Finland.  
In the six EU-founders group, the EPO patent applications volume 
demonstrates a similar trajectory as the R&D expenditures volume. Germany 
safely ranks among innovation leaders, and despite quite a large distance 
Belgium and Luxembourg also do. Italy showed lower numbers of EPO patent 
applications, aligning almost perfectly with the trajectory of the southern regime 
countries. 
Austria is again the best performing EU country throughout the observed 
period in terms of EPO patent applications accumulation (it reached the levels of 
the Scandinavian countries and Germany).  
The southern regime countries has developed synchronously, with the 
worst results registered by Portugal.  
With the exception of Slovenia, the “new” EU member states converge in 
terms of their low levels of innovation output, and thus fall into the category of 
innovation laggards. Slovenia is again the only “new” EU member that has 
managed to increase its innovation output (measured by EPO patent 
applications) up to the levels of the southern regime countries and Italy.  
Table 2. Convergence within EU social regimes measured by standard deviation of national EPO 
patent applications 
 
SOC-
DEM 
CONS - 
German 
speaking 
CONS - 
French 
speaking 
LIB SOUTH NEOLIB EMB. NEOLIB 
1995 38.84 53.07 16.33 26.98 3.88 0.70 1.87 
1996 43.25 66.81 21.68 29.85 4.27 1.73 2.32 
1997 57.93 65.20 21.75 30.28 6.05 2.11 2.64 
1998 46.98 83.88 33.63 27.00 6.58 1.78 2.63 
1999 59.69 85.81 29.85 25.74 6.50 2.60 4.23 
2000 49.73 85.63 46.81 34.21 6.68 1.50 4.52 
2001 50.15 81.92 59.43 21.45 8.63 3.26 3.70 
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2002 35.42 74.49 46.00 26.35 7.99 1.71 4.50 
2003 21.61 68.50 44.51 26.63 7.50 2.36 4.98 
2004 30.81 71.93 58.38 18.67 10.27 1.70 5.63 
2005 26.22 73.69 43.98 18.85 8.73 2.80 4.76 
2006 42.70 56.67 52.70 18.05 10.20 6.55 6.41 
2007 39.31 61.87 28.24 10.78 8.97 9.47 7.61 
2008 49.75 58.52 24.72 8.17 8.54 11.57 8.24 
2009 60.91 53.83 19.52 4.23 9.50 15.39 9.43 
Source: authors’ own calculations, based on the data used in Figure 4 derived from EUROSTAT 
2013 databases. 
In terms of EPO patent applications, convergence is not as visible as in 
terms of total R&D expenditures (Table 2), the only exception being the liberal 
social regime. This phenomenon may have its roots in the following: 
• EPO patent applications account only for a part of total R&D output (as 
stated previously in the second part of this paper), 
• EPO patent applications may also be subject to co-ownership. 
The development of R&D expenditures (Figure 2) and of innovation 
product (Figure 3) in the EU during the period 1995 – 2010 implies a profiling 
of four innovation-performance groups.  
1. innovation leaders (countries of social/democratic regime, German 
speaking countries of conservative regime – Germany and Austria), 
2. innovation followers (French speaking countries of conservative regime), 
3. average innovators (countries of liberal regime, Italy and Slovenia), 
4. innovation laggards (countries of embedded neoliberal, neoliberal and 
southern regime, except Italy). 
However, when considering R&D effectiveness (input-weighted output 
parameters), we come to different results.  
5.3. Performance of EU social regimes in terms of R&D effectiveness 
The effectiveness of innovation inputs can be measured using the 
incremental innovation output ratio (Rastogi 2009, pp. 45-50), or through the 
elasticity of innovation output on innovation inputs, following the equation: 
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                                                   (2) 
where the PAT is the number of EPO patent applications and INNEX is 
the volume of R&D expenditures (total intramural expenditures in the R&D 
sector, including also the salaries of all R&D personnel).  
Figure 4 demonstrates that the elasticity of EPO patent applications on 
total R&D expenditures in all social regimes is lower than one, and thus the 
number of EPO patent applications increase at a slower pace than R&D 
expenditures.  
The most stable elasticity throughout the observed period is demonstrated 
by the countries of social-democratic and conservative regimes, Italy, and even 
the liberal countries. The emergence of Slovenia has converged steeply with the 
elasticity of liberal regime countries. 
Figure 4. Elasticity of PAT on INNEX in EU social regimes 
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Source: authors’ own calculations, data extracted from EUROSTAT 2013 databases. 
Innovation laggards maintained their R&D effectiveness at a relatively 
lower level, although converging also against innovation leading countries.  
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The same basic results are demonstrated (Figure 5) by the elasticity of 
EPO patent applications per million inhabitants (PAT) on workforce in R&D per 
million inhabitants (INNEMPL) following the equation: 
                                           (3) 
Figure 5 confirms again that Slovenia is the only country from the “new” 
member countries that has managed to increase its R&D workforce efficiency, 
measured by the elasticity of EPO patent applications to the R&D workforce 
volume, up to the levels of the best performing innovation countries, i.e. 
regimes. 
Figure 5 further proves that the elasticty of innovation output on R&D 
employment is lower than its elasticity on R&D expenditures – maximally at the 
level of 0.5. 
Figure 5.  Elasticity of PAT to INNEMPL in EU social regimes 
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Source: authors’ own calculations, data derived from EUROSTAT 2013 databases. 
The so-calculated results concerning R&D effectiveness thus distinguish 
between two innovation-performance groups: 
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1. Innovation leaders (innovation better performing countries), 
2. Innovation laggards (innovation worse performing countries)3. 
The category of innovation leaders includes, besides countries of social-
democratic and conservative regimes, also countries of liberal (Great Britain, 
Ireland), neocorporativist (Slovenia) and the southern regime of Italy. The 
Italian performance in terms of innovation and technology measures is better in 
comparison to their southern regime partners, and the reason may lay in its 
longer tradition in the European communities, i.e. 20 more years of association 
with the innovation leading countries of conservative regimes.  
The other southern regime countries, as well as countries of neoliberal and 
embedded neoliberal, together with Romania and Bulgaria, can be put into the 
group of innovation lagging countries. 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper we have presented various measures that divide EU countries 
into innovation performance groups.  
The primary measures of innovation (total intramural R&D expenditures, 
EPO patent applications) distinguish between four groups of social performance 
regimes. In terms of R&D effectiveness (measured by the elasticity of EPO 
patent applications to R&D expenditures), there are only two groups to be 
identified.  
The best performing social regimes in terms of innovation are the social-
democratic and conservative. The worse performing social regimes in terms of 
innovation are the regimes of most “new” member countries, with the exception 
of Slovenia, which is the only “new” member country that has managed to catch 
up with the innovation leading liberal countries, although only in terms of R&D 
effectiveness. 
The development of R&D expenditures is, in fact, synchronized, 
converging within each social regime of innovation leaders (the only exception 
is maybe the southern regime), and diverging within the innovation lagging 
countries– several countries from the innovation laggards group have 
experienced a more rapid accumulation of R&D expenditures (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, etc.) than the others (Slovakia, Poland). This may imply the more 
                                                 
3
 We would like to point out that in other publications the terms „innovation leaders“ and 
„innovation laggards“ relate to other classifications based on other measures of innovation, and 
these are not to be mistaken for ours. 
                                             The Research And Development Performance...                                37 
 
general thesis that in the earlier stages of economic development, R&D spending 
policies vary by country. In other words, more developed countries manage to 
attain the R&D spending limits and other countries have to catch up.  
This paper can also shed some light on the thesis that R&D spending 
levels and limits are determined by the relevant culturally-shaped social regime. 
References 
Bohle D., Greskovits B. (2007), Neoliberalism, embedded neoliberalism and neocorporatism: 
Towards transnational capitalism in central-eastern Europe,‘West European Politics’, Routledge, 
Vol. 30, No. 3 
Bonoli G. (1997), Classifying Welfare States: a two-dimension approach, ‘Journal of Social 
Policy’, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 26, No. 3 
Eaton J., Kortum S. (1999), International technology diffusion: Theory and measurement., 
‘International Economic Review’, Wiley Blackwell, Vol. 40 
Esping-Andersen G. (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey 
Eurostat(2013), EUROSTAT Database Available at:  
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database> 
Ferrera M. (1996), The southern model of welfare in social Europe, ‘Journal of European Social 
Policy’, Sage Publications, Vol. 6, No. 1 
Griliches Z. (1984), Introduction to R&D, Patents and Productivity, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 
Griliches Z. (1990), Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey, ‘Journal of Economic 
Literature’,American Economic Association Publishing, Vol. 28 
Jaffe A., Trajtenberg M. (2002), Patents, citations and innovations: A window on the knowledge 
economy, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA) 
Katayama H., Lu S., Tybout J. R. (2009), Firm-level productivity studies: Illusions and a solution, 
‘International Journal of Industrial Organization’, Elsevier, Vol. 27, No. 3 
Keller W. (2010), International trade, foreign direct investment, and technology spillovers, [in:] 
Hall B., Rosenberg N. (Eds) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation – Volume 2, Elsevier, 
North-Holland  
Manuelli R. E., Seshadri A. (2010), Human Capital and the Wealth of Nations. Available at: 
http://www.econ.wisc.edu/~aseshadr/working_pdf/humancapital.pdf  
38                                                       Paula Puškárová, Jana Gurníková                                              
 
Puškárová P. (2012), Inovačná výkonnosť krajín V4, [in:] Machová M, Petianová A (eds) 
EDAMBA 2012: proceedings of international scientific conference for doctoral students and 
young researchers: 22nd November, 2012 Bratislava. Publishing House Ekonom, Bratislava 
Rastogi P. (2009), Management of technology and innovation: Competing through technological 
excellence. SAGE Publications, New Delhi 
 
 
Streszczenie 
 
OSIĄGNIĘCIA W OBSZARZE DZIAŁALNOŚCI BADAWCZO-
ROZWOJOWEJ W RÓŻNYCH SYSTEMACH SPOŁECZNYCH  
KRAJÓW UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ 
 
W artykule przedstawiono nowy sposób klasyfikacji krajów UE z punktu widzenia 
stopnia ich osiągnięć innowacyjnych z uwzględnieniem systemu społecznego. Wstęp 
nawiązuje do wybranych danych empirycznych, dotyczących powiązania osiągnięć 
badawczo-rozwojowych (B&R) z typem systemu społecznego. Część druga i trzecia 
zawiera przegląd literatury dotyczącej pomiaru osiągnięć badawczo-rozwojowych. 
Część czwarta to podsumowanie klasyfikacji systemów społecznych. Piąta i najdłuższa 
część artykułu zawiera analizę porównawczą danych empirycznych, wskazującą różnice 
dotyczące zarówno danych liczbowych jak i systemów społecznych wchodzących w skład 
poszczególnych grup. W końcowej części pracy przedstawiono streszczenie najważniejszych 
wniosków. 
 
